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_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  ABSTRACT 
 
This article shows that the increase of income inequality and global wealth concentration was an 
important driver for the financial and Eurozone crisis. The high levels of income inequality 
resulted in balance of payment imbalances and growing debt levels. Rising wealth concentration 
contributed to the crisis because the increasing asset demand from the rich played a key role in 
the growth of the structured credit market and enabled poor and middle-income households to 
accumulate increasing amounts of debt. This analysis thereby puts both income and wealth 
inequality to the epicentre of the recent crisis, and is crucial for social scientists analysing the 
causes of the crisis. Our findings suggest that the policy response to the crisis must not be limited 
to financial regulation but has to involve policies to address inequality by increasing the 
bargaining power of labour as well as redistributive tax policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic inequality has become a prominent topic in public debate after the publication of 
Piketty’s (2014) book Capital in the Twenty-First Century. The last time that the topic reached 
such a prominence was in the 1930s when it was widely accepted that inequality was a cause for 
the Great Depression (Eccles, 1951; Galbraith, 1975). As a response policy makers of developed 
countries increased top marginal income and wealth taxes sharply, regulated markets and 
strengthened the social welfare system during the middle of the twentieth century. The result of 
these policies, which went hand in hand with the post-war boom in OECD countries, was a sharp 
decline in inequality levels. 
During the 1970s falling profits created growing discontent with the economic status quo by 
the ruling elite, which in turn contributed to a push towards neoliberal reforms so that most 
regions in the world deregulated markets, strengthened corporate control and lowered personal 
and corporate taxes, resulting in a deterioration in working conditions and labour’s bargaining 
power and a polarization of income and wealth at levels not seen since the 1930s (Crotty, 2012; 
Piketty, 2014; Vidal, 2013).  
Authors like Stiglitz (2012), van Treeck (2014) and Kumhof et al. (2015) argue that rising 
income inequality was a root cause for the rapid growth of the US non-prime mortgage market 
and the global balance of payment imbalances that contributed to the Great Recession. Moreover, 
Lysandrou (2011b), Milanovic (2011) and Goda and Lysandrou (2014) stress that the global rise 
in the absolute concentration of wealth was an important contributing factor to the financial crisis, 
because the growing demand from very rich individuals for investable securities was a major 
driver behind the growth of the structured credit market. 
This article shows that the integration of these two strands of research, which analyse distinct 
transmission mechanisms of the contribution of inequality to the crisis, is important for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the crisis. We therefore extend the existing literature on 
the complex relation between inequality and financial instability by integrating the analysis of 
income inequality and wealth concentration and its effects on consumption and debt levels, 
balance of payment imbalances, and financial innovation more thoroughly than in the previous 
literature. The article is also distinct in that it analyses the financial crisis in the US as well as the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The crisis in the Eurozone and the global financial crisis 
typically are analysed in isolation, but we argue that they are interconnected. To be more precise, 
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we argue that the Eurozone crisis was triggered by the financial crisis, and that in the US as well 
as in the Eurozone high levels of inequality contributed to balance of payment imbalances and 
growing private debt levels.  
We believe this analysis is crucial for social scientists with an interest in the social 
consequences of the crisis (see e.g. Bassens et al., 2013; Fujita, 2011; Munoz Martinez and 
Marois, 2014; Sidaway, 2008) in order to better understand how causes of the crisis are related to 
income and wealth inequality. The mainstream economic analysis of the crisis has been narrow 
and fails to incorporate socio-economic variables like inequality in their analysis (see Stiglitz, 
2011 for an in-depth discussion). Instead, the mainstream focuses on the regulation of global 
financial markets (e.g., Davies, 2010; Major, 2012), central bank policy failures (e.g., Taylor, 
2009), market failures (e.g., Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008) and irrational behaviour (e.g., 
Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Our study, on the contrary, puts inequality to the epicentre of the 
crisis and is an attempt to question neoliberal policies, which were the driving force behind the 
rise in inequality and still dominate policies under the heading of the so-called structural reforms 
since the crisis, despite their failure to generate growth (Stockhammer, 2015; Vidal, 2013). The 
results of this analysis strongly suggest that the policy response to the crisis must not be limited 
to financial regulation but needs to involve policies that increase the bargaining power of labour 
as well as redistributive wealth taxation. 
The next section shows how the financial crisis began in the market for subprime derivatives 
and morphed into a financial crisis, an economic crisis and, in the Eurozone, in a sovereign debt 
crisis. The third section clarifies why income inequality was a main ingredient for the emergence 
of debt-driven and export-driven growth models, and an important reason behind the rise of 
current account imbalances. The fourth section illustrates how global wealth concentration 
contributed to these developments and argues that increasing wealth holdings at the top were a 
crucial driver behind the securitization of (subprime) loans. The overall findings of the article 
and policy recommendations are consolidated in section five. 
 
 
FROM THE US SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
 
In summer 2007 the market for certain structured financial securities completely broke down. 
The reason for this was that the super senior tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
 5 
 
started to suffer losses because of rapidly rising delinquency and foreclosure rates on US 
subprime mortgages. The collapse of the entire CDO market, in turn, led to uncertainty and panic 
in the global banking sector because the exact extent of the balance sheet risk exposure of 
financial institutions was unclear (Acharya et al., 2011; Shin, 2012). 
The subsequent breakdown in trust between large commercial banks (many of whom owned 
or sponsored investment vehicles that were directly exposed to this market segment) set in 
motion a liquidity-solvency crisis spiral, which in September 2008 culminated in the paralysis of 
the whole financial system when the world’s third largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, 
declared bankruptcy and the insurance company American International Group (AIG) collapsed. 
The following flight to safe securities caused a decline in the government bond yields, most 
notably in the US, UK and Germany, and interbank lending literally stopped. The freezing of the 
interbank market meant that banks started to hoard liquidity, with the result that most households 
and firms lost access to credit. 
The result was a global recession in 2008/09 and, subsequently, the Eurozone crisis that 
started in 2010. One outcome of the financial crisis and the recession was that European 
governments needed to rescue two types of banks: (i) banks that bought the toxic securities that 
triggered the subprime crisis, and (ii) highly leveraged banks that had a maturity mismatch and 
could not roll-over their debt. Another outcome was that government revenues declined while 
welfare spending increased. Accordingly, public deficits and public debt grew sharply in nearly 
all Eurozone countries. During 2008 and 2009 long-term government bond yields of these 
countries declined or stayed roughly stable due to the flight to safety by investors. However, in 
2010 this situation started to change because investors became concerned about a possible 
default, leading to a rise in the refinancing costs for all countries. This increase in yields was 
relatively minor and temporary in those countries that had export-surpluses, whereas the 
periphery countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal and to a lesser extent Spain (GIPS) experienced a 
longer-lasting increase in risk premia. 
The GIPS have in common that they experienced the build-up of a real estate bubble, rapidly 
increasing private debt and significant current account deficits (ranging from -2.1 per cent in the 
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case of Ireland
1
 to -9.2 per cent in the case of Portugal), which were financed by capital inflows 
from the rest of the world. An outcome of the 2007 crisis was that their real estate bubbles burst, 
which meant that some of their banks went into trouble and unemployment rates rose sharply 
along with a deep recession. The resulting increase in government expenditure and decrease in 
government revenue, coupled with their current account deficits, low growth perspectives and 
relatively weak institutions, meant that investors increasingly feared that these countries would 
not be able to collect sufficient funds to repay their rapidly accumulating debt. This fear 
manifested in increasing sovereign risk premia.
2
 The hike in interest rates made a bailout 
programme necessary as the refinancing costs for GIPS became too high. The accompanying 
austerity measures that were required from the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the IMF were detrimental. They resulted in a decrease in domestic demand that 
contributed to a sharp increase in unemployment, social unrest, a long economic depression and 
a further rise in debt to GDP ratios.  
This experience stands in stark contrast to that of current account surplus countries in the 
Eurozone (Germany Austria, Belgium, Finland and Netherlands). These countries not only 
produced more competitive export goods but their institutions also were perceived as being more 
effective,
3
 so that investors were confident that they would have no problem to raise the revenues 
necessary to repay their debt. Consequently, the demand for their bonds increased again in 2011, 
driving down their sovereign debt costs to historically low levels. Most countries engaged in a 
policy of modest fiscal stimulus during the recession 2008/09. But, while southern European 
countries shifted to sharp austerity after 2010, the fiscal policy stance in northern countries was 
rather neutral. This group of countries thus experienced a quick if shallow recovery from the 
                                                          
1
 Ireland is different from the other GIPS countries in that the source of its current account deficits were 
repatriated profits by multinational corporations and it had trade surpluses, although these deteriorated in 
the 2000s. 
2
 An important reason for the sharp increase in the yields of Greek government bonds was that prior to the 
crisis the Greek administration misreported budgetary data, which came out when the new government 
presented a deficit that was more than twice as high as expected (Hoque, 2013). Portugal also had 
persistent deficits prior to the crisis, while Ireland and Spain had budget surpluses and very low public 
debt to GDP ratios in 2007 (25 per cent and 36 per cent respectively) that only increased sharply because 
of the recession and the high costs of their banking bailouts (especially in Ireland). 
3
 According to World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) the Eurozone export surplus 
countries on average had a perceived government effectiveness score of 1.8 points in 2010, whereas the 
GIPS countries had an average score of 1.0. The GIPS country with the highest score was Ireland (1.3), 
while Finland was the country with the best score among the export surplus countries (2.2). The indicator 
reflects the views of firms, citizens and experts and has a maximum value of 2.5. 
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2009 recession, although initially they were hit hard by the recession as a result of the sharp 
decline of their exports. This recovery was only short lived however, with the result that in 2013 
the growth of both the current account surplus and the GIPS countries was either stagnating or 
negative. 
This analysis shows that the main cause for the Eurozone crisis was not the lack of fiscal 
discipline in the periphery, as argued by many mainstream analysts (e.g. Costa and Ricciuti, 
2013; Schuknecht et al., 2011), but rather the outcome of the loss in market confidence and the 
recession triggered by the financial crisis in combination with the current account imbalances 
within the region and the structural flaws of the European economic policy regime. It was the 
design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) that led to an escalation of the Eurozone crisis. 
The EMU has supported transnational capital flows rather than leaning against financial bubbles 
and it has imposed fiscal austerity in countries in recession. Most importantly the ECB has been 
mainly concerned with inflation targeting and reluctant to act as a lender of last resort for 
member states (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; Sawyer, 2013; Stockhammer, 2016a; Storm and 
Naastepad, 2015c). Effectively, ECB support for national financial systems has been conditional 
on specific fiscal policy measures. In the standoff with Greece in spring 2015 the ECB has, by 
withdrawing liquidity support, effectively shut down a member state’s financial system in order 
to enforce a certain fiscal policy stance. The goal of financial stability was subordinated to a 
political agenda. The initial trigger of the Eurozone crisis thus was the banking crisis, the 
following recession and the loss of confidence, while the causes of the crisis lie in the domestic 
property bubbles and the imbalances that had built up prior to the crisis. The reasons why the 
crisis deepened and turned into a sovereign debt crisis are to be found in the EMU’s policy 
regime however. 
A distinctive feature of the pre-crisis era was an increase in income inequality within 
developed countries as well as a global increase in absolute wealth concentration (Goda, 2014; 
Piketty, 2014). While it is widely acknowledged that distributional issues have to figure 
somewhere in the plot of these events, the question arises if income inequality and wealth 
concentration were at the very root of the recent crisis. The remainder of this article intends to 
answer this question. 
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INCOME INEQUALITY AND DEBT- AND EXPORT-DRIVEN GROWTH 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a clear reversal of the trends towards relatively egalitarian 
income distribution during the post-war era. On the one hand, there has been a significant decline 
in the share of wages in GDP across the globe (OECD, 2012; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; 
Stockhammer, 2015, 2016b). Figure 1 shows the adjusted wage share in national income in the 
developed world.
4
 The share of wages has fallen by 10 percentage points in the Eurozone, and 
even more in Japan. In parallel to this, in English-speaking countries a sharp polarization of 
personal income distribution and a rise in the remuneration of top managers have occurred since 
the 1980s (Atkinson et al., 2011). 
 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the share of the top 1 per cent of the income distribution in the US 
has reached 18 per cent of GDP prior to the crisis, exceeding the levels before World War I and 
the Great Depression; the UK followed a similar pattern. Since managerial wages are part of 
wages, this has led to a more modest decline in the wage share in the US and the UK compared 
to continental Europe. Top income shares did not experience the same surge in continental 
Europe. In the case of Germany this can be explained partly by the fact that many companies 
retained large parts of their rising profits (Behringer et al., 2014). Nevertheless, similar to the US 
and the UK in Germany also a significant low wage segment emerged (Vidal, 2013). 
Nevertheless, whether the rise in personal income inequality was caused by a rise in top incomes 
or the generation of a low wage sector, in all the countries a trend towards greater inequality in 
personal income distribution went along with a fall in the wage share.
5
 
[Figure 2] 
                                                          
4
 Wages are adjusted labour compensation (real compensation per employee multiplied by total 
employment). 
5
 These developments are in line with a global trend of rising income inequality within countries, ‘about 
80 per cent of the world’s population now lives in regions whose median country has a Gini close to 40’ 
(Palma, 2011: 87). 
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A fall in the wage share reflects falling unit labour costs, and increasing profitability. 
Mainstream economic policy, informed by neoclassical economics, thus expects the decline in 
the wage share to be associated with stronger growth and employment. However, since 1980 
growth has not been particularly strong in developed countries, which is a puzzle for mainstream 
economics. Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian models
6
 suggest that wages have not only a role as 
cost item but also as a source of demand. To be more precise, a rise in inequality in the form of a 
fall in the share of wages will, other things being equal, suppress domestic consumption since the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wages is higher than that out of profits. However, it may 
also have a positive effect on investment due to increased profitability, and improved 
international competitiveness might lead to higher net exports due to lower unit labour costs. In 
order to assess the effects of wage moderation it is necessary to address the effects on all three 
components of private demand. If the differentials in marginal propensity to consume between 
wages and profits is relatively large, but the responsiveness of investment to profitability and net 
exports to relative price changes are low, then the total effect of the increase in the profit share 
on aggregate demand and hence growth would be negative, and the demand regime is called 
wage-led. If the effect is positive, it is called profit-led. The question whether the negative effect 
of lower wages on consumption or the positive effect on investment and net exports is larger is 
an empirical issue.  
Empirical research that has been conducted in an attempt to identify these opposite effects 
(e.g. Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2006; Onaran and Galanis, 2014; 
Stockhammer et al., 2009) suggests three important findings: firstly, consumption reacts more 
sensitively to a decrease in the wage share than does investment, hence domestic demand 
(consumption and investment) is wage-led in all countries. The character of the demand and 
growth regimes thus depends crucially on the relevance of the net export effects. Secondly, the 
effects via the international trade channel depend on the elasticity of exports and imports to 
prices and labour costs as well as the degree of trade openness. Relatively closed large 
                                                          
6
 Post-Keynesian economics builds on Keynesian theory of effective demand. It deviates from 
mainstream Keynesianism in that it regards Keynes’ work as break with the neoclassical traditions. In 
particular post-Keynesians reject the need for micro foundations and the marginal productivity theory of 
income distribution. It often uses class analysis as a foundation of macroeconomic analysis. See Bhaduri 
and Marglin (1990) and Lavoie (2009). 
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economies (like the US and Germany) tend to be wage-led as opposed to relatively small open 
economies, where net exports may play a major role in determining the overall outcome. Thirdly, 
in a large region like the Eurozone or in the current state of high international integration in the 
world economy the international competitiveness effects of declining wage shares are eliminated 
when the fall in the wage share takes place simultaneously across all countries. 
The expected outcome of the race to the bottom in the wage share in Europe and in the global 
economy since the 1980s should, therefore, have been a stagnation of global demand and growth. 
So how did the world economy or individual countries manage to grow prior to the Great 
Recession? Stagnation in demand was circumvented by two distinct growth models: (i) a debt-
driven growth model in the US, UK, Australia in the core and in the periphery in the GIPS and 
Eastern Europe; and (ii) an export-driven growth model in Germany, Austria and Japan in the 
core. The debt-driven and the export-driven growth models are complementary in that the 
export-driven growth regimes can pursue mercantilist models only in the presence of debt-driven 
deficit countries. Hence both rely on increasing accumulation of debt, and they are both equally 
fragile reflecting the global imbalances that have grown dramatically in the 2000s; the 
unsustainability of these global imbalances became evident in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession.  
At the root of both models lie different ways to react to the same chronic domestic demand 
deficiency due to declining wage shares. The way different countries dealt with this potential 
crisis of demand depended on their structural parameters regarding their position in the global 
value chains, history of industrial policies, employment relations and differences in 
financialization. Financial deregulation of the 1980s and the role of the financial industry were 
strongest in the US and the UK. In the periphery of Europe, European integration and the 
liberalization of capital flows were determining factors in making debt-driven growth feasible.  
International financial deregulation made persistent long-term current account imbalances in 
the debt-driven growth regimes feasible without major currency adjustments, which were in 
return financed by capital inflows from the export-driven countries with persistent current 
account surpluses. In 2007 Germany had a current account surplus of 7.5 per cent of GDP, while 
the US had a deficit of 5.1 per cent. Exchange rates were not adjusting to trade imbalances but 
were determined by capital flows chasing financial return. International financial liberalization 
has thus created the conditions for debt-driven and export-driven growth models to co-exist for 
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extended periods as long as the financial investors find the debt situation in the debt-driven 
growth models sustainable. 
As discussed in section two, within the Eurozone itself, the crisis laid bare former 
divergences caused by the process of monetary union. Productivity and production structures did 
not converge, and although inflation rates came down in all countries, the countries that had low 
inflation prior to the Euro also had lower inflation afterwards, which led to the increasing 
divergence of nominal unit labour costs (Stockhammer and Onaran, 2012). In conjunction with 
differences in technological competitiveness and an economic boom built on rising property 
prices and household debt, this resulted in sizable current account disequilibria across the 
Eurozone.
7
 Accordingly, the southern and eastern periphery of Europe has experienced massive 
capital inflows for more than a decade from the trade surplus countries (most of all Germany), 
which has financed debt-driven spending and resulted in the accumulation of massive external 
liabilities in the trade deficit countries. 
In Greece it was mostly the government sector that accumulated debt, in Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain it was rather the private sector, and in particular the household sector (Lapavitsas et al., 
2010): between 2000 and 2008 private household debt to GDP ratios increased by 62, 21 and 33 
percentage points in Ireland, Portugal and Spain respectively, whereas it shrank in Germany by 
11 percentage points (Stockhammer, 2015, 2016a). In the debt-driven countries, growth driven 
by increasing debt, financed by capital inflows led to asset and/or property price bubbles, which 
fuelled the increase in debt via equity withdrawals. In the export-driven countries, on the 
contrary, net exports have provided the main driving force for demand. In the extreme case of 
Germany, three quarters of GDP growth has been driven by net exports since 2000 
(Stockhammer and Onaran, 2012). 
To what extent does our argument differ from the existing literature? To begin with, most 
mainstream economics regards the crisis foremost as a financial issue (e.g. Blanchard, 2009; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Roubini and Mihm, 2010), while distributional considerations are often 
disregarded. There are some exceptions though. Rajan (2010) contends that skill-biased 
technological change increased permanent inequality in the US, and induced the US government 
to encourage credit growth in general and the subprime mortgage market in particular so as to 
                                                          
7
 Storm and Naastepad (2015a; 2015b) argue that the debt-based spending boom and the low 
technological competitiveness of peripheral Eurozone countries were more important in explaining these 
disequilibria than unit labour cost differences. 
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expand consumption. Stiglitz (2009, 2012) also argues that aggregate demand would have been 
insufficient without a rise in private debt levels that ‘fuelled a consumption boom that allowed 
Americans to live beyond their means’ (Stiglitz, 2012: 54). In contrast to Rajan, for Stiglitz the 
main reasons for this situation were that poor and middle-income households tried to keep up 
with the richer parts of the society, and that rent seeking led to market distortions. 
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2015) develop a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with investors and workers, in which an increase in inequality results 
in rising debt of workers that is financed from savings from investors. As workers become over-
indebted, the number of defaults increases, and a financial crisis emerges. A shortcoming of this 
model is that it does not involve asset and property price bubbles and that lending is solely 
driven by savings. In none of these mainstream contributions are the emergence of different 
growth regimes and the role of inequality in contributing to balance of payment imbalances 
central. The only exception is Kumhof et al. (2012), who extend the Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) 
model to a two-country case where the rich population in countries with less developed financial 
markets finances the rising debt of the poor population in countries with more developed 
financial markets. However, they do not analyse the imbalances within the Eurozone, and, 
specifically, they do not explain why countries with highly developed financial markets (like 
Germany) also have financed the poor population in other countries. 
The same is true for Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), who argue that rising income inequality 
depressed aggregate demand in both the US and in Europe. However, the increase in inequality 
was accompanied by above potential growth rates in the US and UK as opposed to sluggish 
growth rates in most continental European countries. These growth differences are explained by 
the fact that financial deregulation increased the ability of US, UK and Spanish households to 
indebt themselves, while this was not so easily possible for German, French and Italian 
households. Moreover, the authors state that the relatively unsuccessful German export-driven 
growth strategy (in terms of growth) can be explained by the more expansionary fiscal policy in 
the US. 
Among Post-Keynesian and Marxian economists the issue of income distribution has 
featured more prominently. Two notable Post-Keynesian analyses are Palma (2009) and 
Galbraith (2012). Palma discusses in detail the pre-crisis income polarization in the US, and he 
argues that a crucial reason behind the crisis was that neoliberalism reduced the pressure for 
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large companies to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy so that rent seeking 
intensified which, in turn, destabilized the system. Galbraith’s contribution mainly focusses on 
pay disparities across industries and regions, and their contribution to global income inequality 
trends during the last 30 years. Moreover, he argues that finance is an important factor to explain 
these disparities and he claims, in line with Rajan (2010: 293), that ‘the Bush administration 
launched the “ownership society”, overtly encouraging massive expansion of lending to weak 
credits, and relaxing the regulatory standards that had previously protected credit quality in this 
area. Before too long, the subprime boom was under way’. 
Several other heterodox authors ― like Foster and Magdoff (2009), Hein (2012), Palley 
(2012), Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) and van Treeck (2014) ― have offered analyses that 
substantially overlap with ours. They show that prior to the crisis a structural demand gap in the 
US, due to the fact that wages were increasing more slowly than productivity, was hidden by the 
growth of the financial sector and increasing household debt of the bottom 95 per cent.
8
 While 
this debt-driven consumption allowed the US to grow prior to the crisis, the demand impact 
turned negative after the crisis when the bottom 95 per cent of households could no longer 
finance their consumption with debt.
9
 As a result growth rates are now well below their pre-crisis 
trends in the US (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2015; Palley, 2016).10 Foster and Magdoff (2009), 
Palley (2012) and van Treeck (2014) also stress that the debt-driven growth model led to a large 
current account deficit in the US, and Behringer and van Treeck (2013) argue that rising top 
income shares had similar effects in countries like the UK and Italy. The work of Hein (2012) 
and Hein and Mundt (2012) are closest to ours. Both identify rising inequality, rising household 
debt, global imbalances and financial deregulation as the main causes of the crisis; and they 
distinguish between debt-driven and export-driven regimes. 
                                                          
8
 Barba and Pivetti (2009), Hein (2012) and van Treeck (2014) argue that US households increased their 
debt to keep up their consumption with richer parts of the population (the so called ‘keeping up with the 
Joneses’ effect) 
9
 One reason why this debt-driven growth was no longer possible was a sharp decrease in the wealth of 
poor and middle income households. Wolff (2012) shows that between 2007 and 2010 median household 
wealth in the US nearly halved. 
10
 A study by Cripps et al. (2011), using a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model, furthermore suggests that 
under the current conditions the pattern of underconsumption in some countries and over-borrowing in 
other countries will prevail, with the outcome that it is likely that global imbalances and crises will re-
emerge. 
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In contrast to this analysis, most of the Marxist literature concentrates on overproduction (a 
surplus of capital and lack of investment opportunities), rarely distinguishes between different 
growth regimes and mainly focuses on US developments. Exceptions are Brenner (2009), 
Dumenil and Levy (2011), Lim and Khor (2011) and Vidal (2013) who discuss international 
imbalances and acknowledge debt-driven growth. A common shortcoming of this research is that 
imbalances within the Eurozone are not discussed in relation to inequality.
11
 Moreover, these 
studies mainly concentrate on demand formation in the real sector but do not analyse the impact 
of wealth distribution and demand formation in the financial market in depth, to which we turn in 
the next section. 
 
 
GLOBAL WEALTH CONCENTRATION AND ASSET MARKETS  
 
Prior to the current crisis, not only functional and personal income inequality but also the extent 
of wealth accumulation at the top increased dramatically. Wealth concentration can be measured 
in relative and absolute terms. Relative wealth concentration refers to the possession of 
disproportionate shares of wealth at the top. It is well documented that relative wealth 
concentration is normally higher than relative income concentration, and that the trend changes 
in top wealth shares (Figure 3) have been to some extent similar to that of top income shares 
(Figure 2). After the First World War the extreme top wealth shares in Europe and the US 
decreased significantly, while they started to increase again from the late 1970s onwards. There 
exists very little data for countries from other regions but estimates suggest that within inequality 
has increased in most countries during the 2000s and that the global top 1 per cent share 
currently is around 46 per cent of total global wealth (Goda, 2014). 
[Figure 3] 
 
 
In order to analyse the effect of wealth concentration on financial investment demand, it is 
important to consider changes in the absolute amount of global wealth holdings at the top of the 
                                                          
11
 Lapavitsas et al. (2010) emphasize the structural contradictions of the Euro as a single currency to 
explain the imbalances; their focus is not on inequality as a root cause of the sovereign debt crisis. 
 15 
 
wealth distribution. The amount of absolute wealth holdings is important insofar as it determines 
how much financial investment demand the wealthy people have, and the global pool rather than 
wealth in a single country in isolation is the relevant indicator as financial capital is highly 
mobile. Unfortunately, ‘official publications do not report estimates of absolute inequality’ 
(Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010: 3). However, some private wealth reports provide estimates of 
the amount of global wealth holdings of those individuals who have a net worth of at least US$1 
million (primary residency excluded) — so-called high net worth individuals (HNWIs). 
According to these reports, between 1986 and 2012 HNWIs’ wealth increased 6.6-fold — 
from US$ 7.2 trillion to US$ 46.2 trillion — and billionaires’ wealth even more than 15-fold.12 
The increase in absolute wealth concentration was especially steep in the years prior to the crisis. 
HNWIs’ net wealth increased more than 1.5-fold between 2002 and 2007, from US$ 26.7 to 
US$ 41 trillion, while the global wealth holdings of billionaires increased 2.3-fold to US$ 3.5 
trillion. This growth can be explained partly by the growth of the HNWI population (from 7.3 
million to 10.1 million individuals) and partly by the increase of the mean wealth per HNWI 
(from US$ 3.66 million to US$ 4.03 million). The tremendous growth in wealth holdings at the 
top means that Rockefeller today would not be within the top 20 of the global billionaires list and 
that at the end of 2012 the four wealthiest men — Slim, Gates, Ortega and Buffet — were more 
than twice as rich as Rockefeller was in 1937 (Goda, 2014). 
One reason for this increase of absolute wealth holdings of HNWIs was an increase in top 
incomes (Saez and Zucman, 2014). Personal income inequality and wealth concentration tend to 
be self-reinforcing because high income households save a higher proportion of their income and 
‘wealth has a substantial impact on the share of income earned by those in the top 0.5 percent of 
the [adjusted gross income] distribution’ (Tuttle and Gauger, 2006: 506). Another reason for this 
exceptional increase in wealth concentration was the sharp increase in global stock market prices 
and real estate values, since increasing asset prices automatically translate into higher wealth 
holdings of their owners, who mainly belong to the richest segment of the population (Wolff, 
2010, 2012).
13
 
                                                          
12
 During the same period global GDP only increased 4.8-fold in current terms. 
13
 In the US, ‘between 1983 and 2010, the top one percent received 38 percent of the total growth in net 
worth, 41 percent of the total growth in non-home wealth, and 39 percent of the total increase in income. 
The figures for the top 20 percent are 101 percent, 100 percent, and 104 percent, respectively–that is to 
say, the upper quintile got it all!’ (Wolff, 2012: 44). 
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In contrast to income inequality, few studies discuss possible economic effects of the 
increase in absolute wealth accumulation at the top. Froud et al. (2001) argue that household 
savings from the richer parts of the US and UK society are increasingly invested in existing 
financial securities rather than the real sector. The result is that companies cannot generate 
enough returns to satisfy investors’ profit expectations. This ‘symptom of low returns’ forces 
companies (i) to divert their activities into areas with higher returns, and (ii) to boost their share 
prices, both of which lead to a ‘coupon type of capitalism’ in which the financial sector becomes 
more and more important and stock market bubbles are building up. Similarly, Wisman and 
Baker (2011) and Wisman (2013: 922) claim that by ‘seeking profitable outlets for its 
dramatically increased income and wealth, the elite fuelled first a stock market boom and then, 
after the high-tech bubble burst, a real-estate boom’ in the US. 
Indeed, between 1997 and 2007 increasing global wealth holdings went hand in hand with a 
sharp increase in stock market and housing prices in the US and the Eurozone. The fact that 
global wealth holdings were increasing continuously and to a stronger degree than the asset 
prices in the US and Eurozone is consistent with the view that the former were driven by the 
latter (Figure 4). The resulting price rally in stock and real estate markets, in turn, contributed to 
the existence of the above discussed debt-driven growth regime in the US, the UK and GIPS 
countries as they provided greater collateral to low- and middle-income households, which 
enabled them to accumulate increasing debt. 
[Figure 4] 
 
Political economists also have acknowledged that the toxic securities that triggered the crisis 
were partly created because ‘there is a growing “wall of money” facing global financial markets 
that is looking for investment opportunities’ (Engelen et al., 2010: 47), which means that the 
crisis ‘is also a story of the financialization of consumer credit networks [that enabled] lenders of 
all kinds to generate new assets’ (Langley, 2008: 136–37). However, in these discussions wealth 
concentration normally is not mentioned but instead emphasis is laid on rising asset demand 
from institutional investors, governments and sovereign wealth funds. This is a shortcoming, 
given that the asset demand from the rich was higher than that of institutional investors. In 2007 
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HNWIs had more asset under management (US$ 41 trillion) than global pension funds (US$ 28 
trillion), mutual funds (US$ 26 trillion) and insurance companies (US$ 20 trillion) (IFSL, 2008). 
Milanovic (2011), Wisman (2013) and Foster and Magdoff (2009) partially address this 
shortcoming, although in a different manner. Milanovic states that ‘[h]igh-net-worth individuals 
and the financial sector were … keen to find new lending opportunities’ (2011: 195) to overcome 
a shortage of investment opportunities. Wisman (2013: 940) argues that ‘investment funds were 
being switched from production to speculation, which stimulated innovations in credit 
instruments’. Foster and Magdoff (2009: 61) affirm that ‘the redistribution of wealth upward 
(through reduced taxes and reductions in social services) ― the results of class war waged 
unilaterally from above ― have not been enough to guarantee an ever-increasing spiral of return 
on capital invested in the productive economy. Thus, continual recourse to new forms of 
gambling, not production of goods or services, is what capital is generating in the pursuit of 
profit’. However, these authors do not provide concrete evidence for these claims nor do they 
specify a concrete transmission mechanism between wealth accumulation and the production of 
structured securities. 
Lysandrou (2011a, 2011b) is the first author to present data and theorize the link between the 
increase in absolute wealth concentration and CDO production in more detail. His innovative 
argument is that the increasing net wealth from HNWIs led to an increasing demand for financial 
products (rather than material goods). This demand, in turn, motivated banks to engage in 
financial innovation to overcome a global shortage of investable securities. To alleviate this 
shortage the market for asset backed securities (ABS) and CDOs was rapidly expanded. A 
shortcoming of Lysandrou’s work is that he does not provide strong empirical evidence for his 
claim (especially regarding causation). To give credibility to this theory it needs to be shown that 
(i) one driving force behind the mortgage securitization growth was a fall in the yield of 
traditional debt securities, (ii) HNWIs contributed to this fall and (iii) these individuals also 
created a demand pressure for CDOs. 
Evidence regarding the first point has been provided by Caballero et al. (2008), Bernanke 
(2011), and Goda et al. (2013). Especially after 2000 many emerging market economies (EMEs) 
were experiencing high growth rates, but their debt security market could not keep up with this 
development. EMEs’ bond markets stayed ‘underdeveloped’; at the end of 2007 the EMEs’ share 
in global GDP was one-third whereas their share in world debt security markets was only ten per 
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cent (IMF, 2008). Due to this global mismatch investors were increasingly ‘forced’ to invest in 
the US where most financial assets are produced (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009). The 
resulting capital inflows not only helped to finance the debt-driven growth model of the US, but 
also led to the phenomena that the supply of traditional investment grade debt securities could 
not keep up with the growing global demand for these securities. Government purchases from 
export surplus countries like China lowered long-term yields of US Treasury and agency bonds, 
while foreign and domestic private investor demand reduced US agency, corporate, and 
municipal bonds yields (Bernanke, 2011; Bertaut et al., 2012; Goda et al., 2013).
14
 The depressed 
yields, in turn, led to a search for alternative debt securities with a higher yield. An excess safe 
asset demand on the part of investors was thus a chief force that drove the expansion of the US 
CDO market (Goda et al., 2013). 
But, in how far were HNWIs from the US and the rest of the world involved in this global 
excess demand?
 
To answer this question, Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimate the size of 
HNWIs’ US bonds holdings and their involvement in the demand pressure, and find that more 
than half of HNWIs’ wealth is comprised of financial securities of which around half is 
comprised of debt securities. Moreover, HNWIs bond holdings are heavily skewed towards the 
US market which is by far the biggest and most liquid market in the world. The rise in HNWIs’ 
wealth holdings thus meant that HNWIs from the US and the rest of the world increased their 
total holdings of US bonds by around 40 per cent between mid-2004 (US$ 2.1 trillion) and mid-
2007 (US$ 2.9 trillion).
15
 The rise in HNWIs bond holdings meant that very rich individuals 
significantly depressed long-term bond yields in the US (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). This result 
suggests that HNWIs significantly contributed to the above mentioned shortage of traditional 
                                                          
14
 Bernanke (2005, 2011) and Bertaut et al. (2012) argue that the US bond demand was mainly driven by 
‘excess’ savings in emerging markets, but also by changing portfolio preferences in European countries. 
We have two issues with this argument. First, theoretically it is based on a loanable funds interpretation of 
financial markets where savings are invested. This contrasts with a Keynesian view, where finance and 
credit (rather than saving) are the key for explaining capital flows (e.g. Borio and Disyatat, 2011). Second, 
Goda et al. (2013) show that the demand from private US investors also increased substantially and partly 
explain the depressed yields of AAA-rated agency, municipal and corporate bonds. 
15
 Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimate that around 60 per cent of US individual bond holdings were held 
by US HNWIs prior to the crisis, while 20 per cent to 30 per cent of foreign private bond holdings 
stemmed from rest of the world HNWIs. Different estimates by Hager (2014) confirm that US bond 
holdings are concentrated in the hands of the top 1 per cent of the population. 
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debt securities, which triggered a ‘search for yield’ by all global investors that helped to 
encourage the demand for CDOs.
16
 
As regards the third point it has to be shown that HNWIs also were involved in the demand 
pressure for CDOs. Rich investors were not directly involved in this market, but indirectly via 
hedge funds, which held nearly half of all issued CDOs by June 2007 (Blundell-Wignall, 2007). 
The absence of rich individuals’ direct involvement most likely can be explained by the complex 
nature of CDOs,
17
 whereas the dominant position of hedge funds can be mainly explained by two 
factors: (i) the exceptional growth of this industry,
18
 and (ii) the pressure that they faced to 
generate above average yields by the investors whose funds were managed by the hedge funds 
(Lysandrou, 2012). An important driver behind this growth and pressure was the increasing 
investment of HNWIs, who increased their hedge fund assets approximately from US$ 500 
billion to US$ 1.1 trillion between 2002 and 2007 (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). 
Hedge fund managers were content with their growing asset base, but it also provided them 
with a problem. To maximize returns hedge funds rely on leverage, and to get access to cheap 
credits they need to provide investment grade collateral to banks. Given that investment grade 
bonds had historically low yields, hedge funds needed to find an alternative that was accepted by 
banks and at the same time kept borrowing costs to a minimum. CDOs were the solution to this 
problem. Their senior tranches could be used as collateral that gave a decent return, while their 
equity tranches were seen as high yielding investment opportunity whose risk could be 
controlled by using put options and credit default swaps.
19
 This strategy allowed hedge funds to 
                                                          
16
 Around 70 per cent of all CDO tranches were investment grade, but although they had the same rating 
as investment grade bonds their structure allowed them to provide better returns than these securities. The 
underlying assets of CDOS were mainly low-rated ABS tranches (and non-investment grade loans and 
bonds), which provided relatively high cash flows. The reason why most CDO tranches received 
investment grade, despite the bad rating of their collateral, was the bundling of different assets from 
different originators and the (wrong) assumption that debtors have independent default probabilities ― 
see Blundell-Wignall (2007) and Coval et al. (2009) for more details. 
17
 An owner of ordinary debt securities can easily find out how risky the investment is and in how far the 
risk of default changes over time. The same is true for ABS investors as the backing collateral also 
consists of a single, homogenous class of assets. CDOs, by contrast, do not meet this transparency 
criterion as they are backed by many different types of asset classes (in their simplest form a CDO is an 
asset backed security consisting of many ABS). That is why each CDO’s price is negotiated over the 
counter by the seller and the buyer, i.e. CDOs have no standard prices.  
18
 Hedge funds’ assets under management more than tripled during 2002–07, reaching US$ 2.2 trillion in 
2007.  
19
 Put options enabled hedge funds to sell an equity tranche at a specified date at a specified price. Credit 
default swaps gave hedge funds the right to be compensated in the case of default. 
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generate an above average return for their clients and high bonus payments for themselves, and 
at the same time generated demand for banks to supply increasing amounts of CDOs. This 
analysis suggests that the historically high level of absolute wealth concentration is crucial to 
explain why the CDO market reached a size that was sufficiently large to endanger the global 
financial system when it collapsed in August 2007. Our analysis of the effects of wealth 
concentration on financial markets has focussed on the USA. This reflects the state of available 
research. As of yet there are no studies that would investigate the impact of HNWI wealth 
holdings on real estate prices and sovereign debt yields for European countries. This would be an 
important area for future research. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that it is crucial to take both income and wealth inequality equally 
into account to grasp the complex relationship between inequality and financial stability, and to 
show that the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis are interconnected. Figure 5 summarizes 
our argument. 
[Figure 5] 
 
Rising income inequality has led to potentially stagnant demand, because the world economy 
overall is in a wage-led demand regime. In neoliberalism this has been overcome via either debt-
driven or export-driven growth models. The debt-driven growth model relied on asset and 
property bubbles to generate credit that ultimately fuelled consumption. This allowed working 
class households in OECD countries to maintain growing consumption while their incomes 
stagnated (in particular in the US and the UK). These countries usually had large current account 
deficits and effectively played the role of a growth engine of the world economy. The export-
driven growth model had stagnant domestic demand and used net export growth as the source of 
demand growth. Both growth models are intrinsically unstable, since they both rely on increasing 
debt to income ratios. In the debt-driven model household debt has risen to allow for growth. 
However, the export-driven growth model also relies on rising debt, but it is not domestic debt, 
but rising foreign debt of its trade partners. The debt-driven and export-driven growth models are 
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thus complementary and they have resulted in rising household debt, international imbalances 
and rising international debt. 
Global wealth concentration played an important role in providing the finance for these 
unstable growth regimes. Rich households (or their trusts) save differently from working class 
households: they save a higher share of their income and hold riskier assets. The superrich, or 
more technically, HNWIs, played a crucial role in that (i) their increasing asset demand helped to 
lower the yield of traditional bond classes, which put pressure on investors to seek alternative 
investment grade fixed income securities that provided higher yields, and (ii) HNWIs were the 
main investors in hedge funds, which, in turn, were the main buyers of CDOs. HNWIs thus 
helped to create the institutions that aggressively developed new financial instruments and, 
ultimately, they provided the funding for subprime loans and growing credit more broadly. 
Economic inequality thus played a crucial role on both the supply and demand sides of the 
market of the toxic securities that were at the epicentre of the financial crisis. While this has been 
documented for the USA, the literature has yet to establish how the growing asset demand of 
HNWIs has affected the stock market and housing prices in the Eurozone and to what extent they 
enabled low- and middle-income households in debt-driven Eurozone countries to accumulate 
debt. The banking crisis, recession and the loss of confidence that followed the subprime crisis 
laid bare the unsustainability of this growth model and showed that economic inequality was a 
crucial contributing factor not only for the crisis. 
Many elements of our argument can be found in the literature. In particular the link between 
income inequality and rising household debt has become widely accepted among many post-
Keynesians and, to a lesser extent, by Marxians and is also discussed at the critical fringes of the 
mainstream (as discussed in section three). The emergence of debt-driven versus export-driven 
growth regimes and the impact of wealth concentration on financial (in)stability are much less 
widely recognized though. Importantly, most of the literature focuses on the US. Our approach 
differs in several ways. Firstly, our internationally comparative analysis exposes that countries 
have relied on debt- or export-driven growth models in reaction to the rise in inequality. 
Secondly, we systematically highlight the link between inequality and demand formation in the 
real and the financial sector and thereby integrate the analysis of income inequality and wealth 
concentration and its effects on consumption and debt levels, balance of payment imbalances, 
 22 
 
and financial innovation. Finally, our article also discusses the link between debt- and export-
driven growth regimes, wealth concentration, and the Eurozone crisis. 
These findings suggest various avenues for future research. First, the interaction between 
different growth regimes needs further analysis. In particular the contribution of capital inflows 
to asset and property price bubbles in advanced economies is under-researched. Second, the 
effect of inequality on the growing demand for financial assets, financial innovation and 
financial fragility deserves a lot more attention than it has hitherto received. Third, there is need 
to develop macroeconomic models that explicitly deal with the link between income distribution, 
asset prices and wealth distribution. One type of model that would be very well suited for these 
kind of analyses would be extended stock-flow consistent (SFC) models, originally developed by 
Godley and Cripps (1983) and Godley and Zezza (1989). The currently existing SFC models (e.g. 
Cripps et al., 2011) make important contributions in analysing the impact of wealth on flow 
variables, but so far they have the shortcoming that they do not account for the existence of 
different investor types (e.g. HNWIs versus ordinary households), different assets types, and the 
quantity dimensions of assets (Lysandrou, 2014). The incorporation of all the key channels 
analysed in our paper could help to overcome this shortcoming in future SFC models.  
An important policy implication arising out of this analysis is that a more egalitarian 
distribution of income is not a luxury that can be taken care of once the crisis and regulatory 
issues have been resolved, but that it is necessary to reverse the actual level of absolute wealth 
concentration and income inequality to help contain the inherent problems of the current mode of 
capitalism. Given that income inequality and absolute wealth concentration have increased 
further since the outbreak of the crisis (Goda, 2014; OECD, 2013), decisive government 
intervention seems necessary to achieve this aim. 
The policy mix requires both the restoration of the link between productivity and real wage 
growth and progressive taxes and social policies. Hence minimum wages should increase in line 
with inflation and productivity and the bargaining power of workers should be strengthened 
through changes in the union legislation and collective bargaining coverage as well as the 
strengthening of the welfare state. With regard to taxes, we agree with Piketty (2014) that a 
wealth tax is needed. Additionally, top marginal income and estate tax rates should be raised. An 
indexation of these taxes would be an appropriate solution to avoid very high concentrations of 
income and wealth (as proposed most prominently by Shiller (2012)). One possible rule would 
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be to link top income and wealth taxes to median incomes and wealth holdings (e.g. a highest 
marginal tax rate of 70 per cent for income above 10 times the median income). Finally, tax 
avoidance and evasion opportunities have to be closed off. As existing governance arrangements 
allow the rich to be highly mobile and secretive, these policies need to be implemented on a 
global or at least regional scale (e.g. in the form of a minimum top marginal tax threshold in 
OECD countries). 
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